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THE VALUE OF COMMITMENT
Abstract
This paper offers an explanation for the widespread phenomenon of
uniform public schooling, which is viewed here as a way for the
government to precommit itself to restraints on future income
redistribution.  Such precommitment is likely to enhance accumulation of
human capital, to bolster economic growth, and, under certain
circumstances, to constitute a preferred choice for a majority of voters.
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Public financing of private goods and services whereby the government undertakes the
obligation to finance provision of a certain uniform level of these goods to every citizen is
commonplace in many countries in the areas of health care, social security and, in
particular, education.
1  Education is widely viewed as a communal responsibility, and
both its financing and substance are controlled to a large extent by the state.  In most
Western countries, the state provides at least ten years of schooling, attendance is
compulsory, and the curriculum is fairly uniform across schools.
2  Correspondingly, the
economic literature has produced several theories to explain the widespread phenomenon
of public education.  The standard explanations focus on positive externalities, credit
constraints, equity concerns, etc.  In addition, there are sociological rationalizations for
public education such as creation of social cohesion and conformity and instilling social
norms and common values.  Lott, 1990, and, more recently, Kremer and Sarychev, 1998,
elaborate along these lines.
The prevalence of public education may appear surprising in light of the greater
degree of flexibility of private education which allows each individual to tailor education
purchases according to his particular taste.  Since individuals differ in their demand for
education, uniform public schooling may seem to be inefficient.  Indeed, it would seem
prima facie that positive spillovers of human capital as well as credit constraints could be
more effectively dealt with by subsidizing private spending on education, rather than by
providing uniform public schooling.  Although public schooling may have distributional3
advantages for the poor, who are provided with the same educational opportunities as the
rich while paying less, it is difficult to defend on efficiency grounds.
Nevertheless, in this paper I argue that private financing of education can be an
inferior public choice independent of any distributional considerations, provided that the
current government representing the parents is unable to precommit the next generation to
a restrained redistributive policy.  Private education leads to greater income variability in
the children generation implying, in turn, larger future income redistribution chosen by
the relatively poor median voter.  Consequently, in anticipation of such distortive
redistribution, the parents tend to underinvest in the education of their children.  In
contrast, public education generates a more equal income distribution for the children,
implying smaller future redistribution and hence a better incentive for the parents to
invest in education.  Thus, the system of public education is likely to generate faster
accumulation of human capital and is shown to be preferable from the viewpoint of a
majority of parents to the alternative of a private education regime.
3
This paper is related to the extensive literature on time inconsistency which
started with Kydland and Prescott’s, 1977, seminal paper.
4  In particular, in the context of
optimal taxation, Fischer, 1980, has shown that the fear of expropriation causes capital to
be under-accumulated when precommitment on tax policy is impossible.  Subsequent
literature has studied the mechanisms through which such precommitment can take place:
reputation building by the policy maker,
5 delegation of policy making power,
6 and
different types of constitutional restraints.
7  Relatedly, in the context of the political
economy of international trade, Rodrik, 1996, advanced the hypothesis that societies
sometimes choose inefficient methods of redistribution in order to limit future4
redistribution; Acemoglu and Robinson, 1996, interpreted the significant expansion of the
franchise which took place in Western countries in the late 19
th-early 20
th century as a
means to commit to future redistribution thereby minimizing the likelihood of an
insurgency; and Persson and Tabellini, 1990, argued that election of a conservative
banker may be an effective way to control inflation.  None of these papers, however,
deals explicitly with human capital accumulation and with the role of public education as
an effective precommitment device.
The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 outlines the model, which then is
analyzed in section 3.  Further discussion and extensions are offered in sections 4 and 5
respectively, and section 6 concludes with some brief remarks.
2. Outline of the basic model
Consider an economy populated by a unit measure of households, each consisting of a
parent and a child.  The parents plan for their two-period life horizon and are assumed to
be altruistic toward their children so that, in particular, parent i derives utility from his
own private consumption, ci1, and from his offspring’s utility.  The latter is derived from
the offspring’s consumption, which, in turn, is determined by her net income, yi2.  We
will assume, without loss of generality, that an offspring’s utility is equivalent to her
income.  All parents have the same preferences and differ solely in their incomes, yi1. The
distribution of parents’ income is denoted F, is assumed twice differentiable with a
positive support in the interval  [a, b], 0<a<b, and is typically skewed so that the average
income (Y1) exceeds its median (ym1).  The preferences are given by
(1) U(ci1, yi2)5
This utility function is assumed to satisfy the standard monotonicity and concavity
assumptions, and the Inada conditions; in addition, we also assume homotheticity
although this is only necessary for some of the results.
The child’s gross income, zi2, is assumed to be determined by the quality of her
human capital, hi2:
(2) zi2 = hi2
Human capital, in turn, is assumed to depend linearly on the amount a parent invests in
his offspring’s education, which is determined from the parent’s budget constraint as
follows:
(3) yi1 = ci1 + hi2
The relationship between the educational investment of the parents and the
income of their children is obtained through the government redistributive policies in
conjunction with the education regime.  In each period the relevant policy is determined
by the vote among the adult population, so that the parents vote in the first period and the
children vote in the second period.
Under private education, in the first period the parents determine individually the
level of educational investment, which in turn determines their offsprings’ quality of
human capital and, subsequently, gross income.  Under public education, all individuals
are provided with a uniform education level which is financed by an education tax, T,
levied on every individual parent. (We assume lump sum taxation in order to minimize
other, distributional advantages of public education; obviously, the more progressive the
taxes are, the better off are the poor majority of parents under public education.)  The
amount of spending on education per child, thus his level of human capital and gross
income therefore is:
8
(4) zi2 = hi2 = T
It should be stressed again that this modeling disregards many realistic features of public
education which would bias public opinion even further towards it, and it allows us to6
focus solely on its commitment value.  An important feature of public education thus
conceived which distinguishes it from other means of government intervention, such as
subsidization of private schooling, for example, is that it minimizes the differences in the
human capital of the children.
The net income of the children is then dependent in both cases on the next period
redistributive policy.  We assume for simplicity that the latter is captured by a single
parameter θ  from the unit interval, which is set by the second period government so that
the relationship between the gross and the net income is as follows:
(5) yi2 = [(1-θ )zi2 + θ Z2] A(θ)
where Z2  is the average gross income of the children. The productivity parameter
A(θ)  captures the excess burden of a redistributive policy and is a decreasing function,
A’(θ) <0.  Redistribution can adversely affect productivity through a variety of channels,
for example, by affecting labor supply or by impairing the incentives to conduct inventive
activities.  Thus, a larger value of θ  implies more redistribution from the rich to the poor;
furthermore, this redistribution also has an adverse effect on everyone’s income. 
 The
redistribution scheme represented by equation (5) can be conceived as being composed of
a lump sum transfer financed by a proportional tax, which also has a “leaked bucket”
component.
The game consists of three stages and the timing of events is as follows.  In the
first, the constitutional stage, the parents collectively choose the education regime –
public or private.  Then, given this choice, educational decisions within the chosen
system are made.  Specifically, if public education is the first stage choice, then the
parents collectively determine the amount of public spending on education; otherwise, if
private education were chosen, each parent would determine the amount of schooling for
her offspring.  The above two stages take place in the first period and the choices made
lead to the determination of the second period gross incomes.  Finally, in the third stage
of the game, which occurs in the second period, the children vote on the extent of income7
redistribution, and the outcome of this vote determines net income, hence consumption of
each child.
3. Analysis
We study the time consistent equilibrium of the game starting with the determination of
the redistribution policy by the children generation.  Assuming first that public education
was the majority choice in the first period, human capital, and therefore gross income of
the children, will be identical.  This implies that no redistribution will be undertaken in
the last stage, θ =0.  Turning to the determination of the equilibrium level of public
education in the second stage of the game, note that its optimal value, from the viewpoint
of parent i, is given by:
(6) -U1(yi1-T, TA(0))+ U2(yi1-T, TA(0))A(0) = 0
Differentiation of (6) reveals that the most preferred T varies positively with income.
Hence, preferences are single peaked, and those of the median income parent are decisive
in determining the equilibrium level of public schooling.
In contrast, consider the determination of redistributive policy by the next
generation assuming that private education was the majority choice in the first period.
For a given distribution of human capital (hence income), the optimal value of the
redistribution parameter for offspring i, θ i, is then given as follows:
(7a) (-zi2 + Z2) A(θ i) +  [(1-θ i)zi2 + θ iZ2]A’(θ i)  = 0, 0<θ i<1
(7b) (-zi2 + Z2) A(0) +  zi2A’(0)  < 0
(7c) (-zi2 + Z2) A(1) +  Z2A’(1)  > 0
Differentiation of the left-hand side of (7a) reveals that θ i decreases with the offspring’s
income implying that the offspring with the median income is decisive: all θ ’s higher than
her most preferred one will be defeated by a coalition of the median income voter and
those richer than her; all θ ’s lower than her most preferred one will be defeated by a
coalition of poor voters.  In other words, preferences in this case satisfy the single-8
crossing property which implies the existence of a majority voting equilibrium, see Gans
and Smart, 1996, for more details.
Rearranging terms, the equilibrium is therefore given as follows:
(8a) (-zm2/Z2+1) +  [(1-θ )zm2/ Z2θ + 1 ]θ A’(θ)/ A(θ)   = 0, 0<θ <1
(8b) (-zm2/Z2 + 1) A(0) +  zm2A’(0) /Z2 < 0
(8c) (-zm2/Z2 + 1) A(1) +  A’(1)  > 0
where zm2 denotes the median income.  This implies that the equilibrium level of
redistribution is a function of the ratio between the median and the average income in the
next generation, zm2/Z2.   Furthermore, differentiation of the left-hand side of (8a) reveals
that it is a decreasing function, so that the higher the ratio the smaller the redistribution.
In particular, inspection of (8) reveals that when the ratio is high enough, no
redistribution is undertaken in equilibrium; when A(θ ) is completely inelastic this
happens when the ratio is 1, but the more elastic A(θ ) is the lower is the cutoff ratio that
generates no redistribution.
The left-hand side of (8a) consists of two terms, the first of which represents the
redistributional effect on offspring with the median income of increasing θ , and the
second of which captures the distortive effect.  Obviously, this second term has a negative
sign: a larger redistribution entails a larger deadweight loss.  As is shown in the following
lemma, the sign of the first term is positive.
Lemma 1.  Given that the parents’ income distribution is typically skewed, for any
anticipated  θ , the distribution of income in the next generation is skewed as well,
implying that the ratio of the median-to-mean income is smaller than one.
Proof.  Homothetic preferences imply that
(9) ci1/yi2 = G(θ ),  G’>0
Substituting the constraints into (9), rearranging terms and solving for the equilibrium
(details are trivial and available upon request) we obtain that the equilibrium level of a9
child’s income is given as a linear combination of own income and the average income in
the parents’ cohort:
(10) zi2 = ayi1 + bY1
But (10) then implies that zm2 < Z2 if and only if ym1 < Y1, so that under the assumption
that the latter holds, the former holds as well. //
Clearly, the elasticity of A(θ ), which captures the distortive effect of income
redistribution, plays a crucial role in determining θ .  In particular, if A(θ ) is inelastic, so
that the deadweight loss is insensitive to redistribution, the left-hand side of (8a) is
positive implying that (8c) holds and that at equilibrium θ =1.  But then, in anticipation of
such extreme redistribution undertaken in the next generation, the parents will refrain
from providing their children with any education, implying in turn that no capital
accumulation will take place.  Thus, the next period income will be minimized, implying
(given the Inada condition) that the parents’ utilities will be smaller than those in the
public education case - which although imposes the same level of schooling on
everybody, does allow for the accumulation of human capital.  This result is summarized
in
Proposition 1.  Provided that the elasticity of redistributional distortion is small enough,
public education constitutes the majority choice.
Note that uniformity of public schooling is essential for the above result, and other
methods of government intervention that perpetuate large variability in human capital
investment would not have the same effect.  Consider for instance the case of a fixed rate
subsidization of private schooling (financed by a proportional income tax, for example).
This policy clearly preserves variability of incomes in the next generation and thus does
not prevent the threat of redistribution, which could again be extreme when A(θ ) is10
inelastic.  But then the previous argument applies and the parents would refrain from
investing in education.
4.  Discussion
To further understand the mechanism behind the popularity of public education, we
reconsider some of the assumptions made above.  One crucial assumption is that the
parents are unable to precommit themselves to a redistributive policy in the next
generation.   Alternatively, suppose that such precommitment is possible.  That is,
suppose that the parents make all the decisions: they determine collectively the value of
the next period redistribution parameter, as well as make the education choices.  Under
private education, for a given value of θ , these choices are given by:
(11) -U1 + U2 A(θ )(1-θ ) = 0
The optimal value of the redistribution parameter for parent i is determined from the
following first-order condition:
(12) (-zi2 + Z2 + θ dZ2/ dθ) A(θ) +  [(1-θ )zi2 + θ Z2]A’(θ)  = 0
Differentiation then reveals that the optimal value of θ  is a monotonically decreasing
function of income, implying as before the existence of a majority voting equilibrium,
with the median income individual being decisive.  Also, comparison between (8) and
(12) reveals - noting that Z2  is a decreasing function of θ  - that the level of redistribution
chosen ex post the education choices is higher than the one determined ex ante.
The outcome in this case is preferred by a majority of voters to that achieved in
the case of public education.  To show this, note that private education without
redistribution, θ =0, is unanimously preferred by the parents to public education: in the11
former case, every parent is free to choose the level of education for his offspring,
whereas in the latter case this decision is imposed by the median income voter.
9  The
higher the value of θ  is,  however, the better off are those individuals whose income is
below the average (and the worse off the rest).  Therefore the poor majority prefers
private education where redistribution is determined by the median income voter to
public education.   Contrasting this result with that of Proposition 1, we conclude that the
inability of parents to determine the next period redistributive policy is crucial for the
paper’s result.
Another salient feature of the above sketched argument is the potential
redistributional pressure by the poor masses in the next generation which is likely to be
materialized under the democratic system of universal franchise.  For if, in contrast, the
income of the decisive voter is high relative to the average income in the next generation
– as would be the case had the franchise been limited to the upper income elite – then no
redistribution would follow, implying that uniformity of public schooling ceases to have
any advantages, and that the public education system is unlikely to constitute the superior
choice in the current generation.
To examine in greater detail the empirical validity of this argument, it may be
useful to review the evolution of the system of public education and democratization
from the historical perspective. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that mass public
education typically flourishes as a consequence of franchise expansion.  In England, for
example, in the period preceding this expansion that took place in the late nineteenth
century, schooling was provided by religious denominations.  Education for the working
classes consisted of religious instruction and the basic three R‘s (reading, writing and12
arithmetic), and only free if they absolutely could not afford it.  While there existed
institutions of higher learning for the elite, the elementary schools were “very much
working-class schools, very much supplied from above.  They were not “popular“ schools
inspired by the people for whom they were intended.“ (Musgrave, 1968, p. 40)  In as late
as 1865, only less than 20% of the adult population were enfranchised. The balance of
political power was changed as a result of the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884.  The
former gave the right to vote to the urban working class, while the latter extended this
right to the workers in rural areas, so that after 1884, 88% of the adult male population
were enfranchised (see Justman and Gradstein, 1999, for a more detailed account of the
enfranchisement process in Britain during this period).  This, in turn, led to an increased
demand for free schooling, first at the elementary school level and subsequently at the
secondary level. Parallel to these developments was the change in attitudes towards
knowledge.  Instead of the traditional view that knowledge was acquired by practice and
effort, transmitted from father to son, and tested by experience, the modern view was
instrumental. The state assumed a more responsible role under the 1870 Education Act,
which made elementary schooling compulsory. The 1902 Act allowed the state to be
directly responsible for running the school system and opened the door for the universal
provision of secondary schooling, which was eventually implemented through the 1944
Act.
An apparent counterexample to this argument is provided by Prussia where public
schooling was introduced by Frederick the Great in as early as 1763.  A careful historical
analysis, however, reveals that the primary impetus for this was ideological – educating
the masses into obedient servants – rather than instrumental.  In fact, public schooling had13
to be imposed on the poor, in many cases against their will, and a powerful system of
school inspection was constructed to enforce compulsory schooling (see Lamberti, 1989).
It was not until after the democratization of the late nineteenth century that the curriculum
was changed becoming more instrumental than ideological, and thus enabling the
students to translate knowledge acquired in school into earned income.  Hence, in
Germany public education in the modern sense of the word was shaped only following
the democratization of the political process and can be interpreted, in line with this
paper’s argument, as a means of containing future redistribution.
5. Extensions
Our results can be further extended by modifying some of the assumptions.  This section
briefly considers these modifications by sketching the required variations of the model
and discussing the robustness of the results.
5.1. Inherited parental input
There is strong evidence suggesting that parental income is an important determinant of
an offspring’s income - indeed, Solon, 1992, finds a correlation of as high as .40 between
the two.  Suppose therefore that (2) is modified to incorporate parental income as follows:
(2’) zi2 = f(yi1)hi2
 where f is an increasing concave function.  Under public education, these differences in
parental income are the only source of variability in the offspring’s income, but under
private education they are amplified by differences in education choices - rich parents
acquiring more education.  This implies that redistribution will be more aggressive in the14
latter case than in the former, which again may deter the parent from making adequate
education choices.  The comparison between the two systems would then hinge on the
interplay between the flexibility advantage of private education and the commitment
advantage of public education.  Qualitatively, however, the previous results will remain
unchanged.
5.2. Endogenous labor supply
To endogenize labor supply decisions, suppose that an offspring’s utility is derived from
consumption, which in turn is determined by her net income, yi2, as well as from the
consumption of leisure, ni2. Each child is endowed with one unit of time which is
allocated between work and leisure, and the child’s gross income, zi2, is assumed to be
determined as a function of the quality of her human capital, hi1, and the amount of time
devoted to work.  Analysis of this variation of the model indicates that the paper’s
argument holds under certain conditions, in particular, when labor supply is sufficiently
inelastic.
5.3 Supplementation of public education
Supplementation of public schooling with private education purchases could also be
considered.  One obvious way of interpreting such supplementation is in terms of extra
private tutoring.  A broader interpretation views private supplements as more years at
school - in addition to publicly provided basic schooling.  In this variation of the model,
education spending is determined through the parents’ vote on public education and
through additional private spending on education.  Analysis of this model (presented in an15
earlier version of the paper and available upon request) reinforces the case for public
education, which emerges as a popular choice irrespective of the magnitude of the
redistributive excess burden.
6.  Concluding remarks
This paper shows that an education system, which allows for individual differences in the
demand for education to express themselves, may provide an incentive for subsequent
aggressive redistribution.  In contrast, a more uniform system, while having the
disadvantage of eliminating otherwise efficient variations, prevents such a redistribution.
More specifically, public financing of education is likely to prevent time inconsistency
that is associated with the threat of future income redistribution, thus yielding a higher
level of human capital accumulation and, therefore, a faster growth of average income
than a private education regime.
While the argument put forth in this paper should be viewed as complementary to
the more standard ones mentioned in the Introduction, it may help explain policies
inexplicable by alternative theories.  For example, positive spillovers of human capital,
have recently been widely articulated in the context of endogenous growth theories,
10
implying that public intervention may be called for.  But in that case education subsidies,
not publicly provided education, is a superior policy, see Devarajan et al., 1996.
11
Similarly, credit constraints that prevent human capital investment by poor families could
be addressed by directly subsidizing the poor.  I argue, however, that such subsidies,
through preserving a significant variability in human capital, might be an ineffective
means of protection against future redistribution.16
This same argument may also be used to explain the fact that public education has
become a widespread phenomenon in Western countries only since the late nineteenth
century, following the expansion of the voting franchise and the democratization of the
political process.  By stretching our model a bit, it could be argued that political decision
making prior to that period was dominated by the rich elite, who were not interested in
fiscal redistribution.  The lack of a redistributive threat, however, renders the
commitment value of public education redundant.  In contrast, with the expansion of the
voting franchise that took place in the late nineteenth century, the threat of future
redistribution has become real, thus increasing the commitment value of public education.
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1 Among the different types of private goods that are publicly financed, education (and, to a lesser extent,
health care) is special in at least two respects.  First, the primary and the secondary components of it are
consumed by minors, that is by a disenfranchised part of the population.  Second, investment in education is
directly related to human capital formation, which ultimately determines an individual’s earning capacity.
Hence, the choice of an education policy shapes future income inequality and affects economic growth.
2 This is definitely the case in countries where education is administered nationally, as in many European
countries; but it also holds to a large extent in the US with its more decentralized, local administration of
schooling.
3 Note that this paper’s focus is public financing of education by which we mean the obligation by the
government to finance a certain uniform level of schooling.  A related important question – not dealt with
explicitly here – is that of public provision, in particular, why do governments actually run schools.  For
some attempts to deal with this latter issue see Lott, 1990, and Kremer and Sarychev, 1998, as well as the
references therein.
4 It is also related to the literature that justifies public financing of private goods by the inability of an
altruistic government to precommit itself - see Bruce and Waldman, 1991, and Coate, 1995.
5 See, e.g., Chari and Kehoe, 1990.
6 As in Persson and Tabellini, 1994.
7 Buchanan and Tullock, 1962, and Brennan and Buchanan, 1980, are the leading contributions to this
literature.
8 We assume for simplicity that no parent will be liquidity constrained with this education tax.
9 In reality this deficiency of the public education system is to some extent mitigated by the progressiveness
of education taxes, the possibility to opt out to private schools, etc.
10 See Lucas, 1988, for the forceful case in this regard.
11 In general, subsidization entails a lower deadweight loss and allows more flexibility than public
provision.